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Abstract. We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on
finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his
own goal set of states as soon as possible. A previous work on this model showed that
Nash equilibria (resp. secure equilibria) are guaranteed to exist in the multiplayer (resp.
two-player) case. The existence of secure equilibria in the multiplayer case remained and is
still an open problem. In this paper, we focus our study on the concept of subgame perfect
equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium well-suited in the framework of games played
on graphs. We also introduce the new concept of subgame perfect secure equilibrium. We
prove the existence of subgame perfect equilibria (resp. subgame perfect secure equilibria)
in multiplayer (resp. two-player) quantitative reachability games. Moreover, we provide
an algorithm deciding the existence of secure equilibria in the multiplayer case.
Introduction
General framework. The construction of correct and efficient computer systems (hard-
ware or software) is recognized as an extremely difficult task. To support the design and
verification of such systems, mathematical logic, automata theory [HU79] and more recently
model-checking [CGP00] have been intensively studied. The efficiency of the model-checking
approach is widely recognized when applied to systems that can be accurately modeled as
a finite-state automaton. In contrast, the application of these techniques to more com-
plex systems like embedded systems or distributed systems has been less successful. This
could be partly explained by the following reasons: classical automata-based models do not
faithfully capture the complex behavior of modern computational systems that are usually
composed of several interacting components, also interacting with an environment that is
only partially under control. One recent trend to improve the automata models used in the
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classical approach of verification is to generalize these models with the more flexible and
mathematically deeper game-theoretic framework [Nas50, OR94].
The first steps to extend computational models with concepts from game theory were
done with the so-called two-player zero-sum games played on graphs [GTW02]. Those
games are adequate to model controller-environment interactions problems [Tho95, Tho08].
Moves of player 1 model actions of the controller whereas moves of player 2 model the un-
controllable actions of the environment, and a winning strategy for player 1 is an abstract
form of a control program that enforces the control objective. However, only purely antag-
onist interactions between a controller and a hostile environment can be modeled in this
framework. In order to study more complex systems with more than two components and
objectives that are not necessarily antagonist, we need multiplayer non zero-sum games.
While in zero-sum games we look for winning or optimal strategies, in non-zero-sum games
we rather try to find relevant notions of equilibria, like the famous notion of Nash equilib-
rium [Nas50]. The secure equilibrium [CHJ06] is a more recent concept that is especially
well-suited for assume-guarantee synthesis [CH07, CR10].
There is another interesting extension in such games: moving from qualitative to quan-
titative objectives. A player has a qualitative objective if his aim is to enforce some spec-
ification (as, for instance, reaching a certain set of target states of the graph), whereas a
quantitative objective implies that he wants to minimize or maximize his gain. For example,
a player may wish to reach a set of target states quickly or with a minimal consumption
of energy. Until now, qualitative objectives have been more studied than quantitative ob-
jectives. However, the latter objectives are as much natural as the former, and so, aught
to be considered. Consequently, we investigate here equilibria for multiplayer non zero-sum
games played on graphs with quantitative objectives. This article provides some new results
in this research direction, in particular it is another step in the quest for solution concepts
well-suited for the computer-aided synthesis and verification of multi-agent systems.
Our contribution. We study turn-based multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite
graphs with quantitative reachability objectives, continuing work initiated in [BBDP10]. In
this framework each player aims at reaching his own goal as soon as possible. In [BBDP10],
among other results, it has been proved that a finite-memory Nash (resp. secure) equilibria
always exists in multiplayer (resp. 2-player) games.
In this paper we consider alternative solution concepts to the classical notion of Nash
equilibria. In particular, in the present framework of games on graphs, it is very natural
to consider the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium [Sel65]: a choice of strategies is not
only required to be a Nash equilibrium from the initial vertex, but also after every possible
initial history of the game. Indeed if the initial state or the initial history of the system
is not known, then a robust controller should be subgame perfect. We introduce a new
and even stronger solution concept with the notion of subgame perfect secure equilibrium,
which gathers both the sequential nature of subgame perfect equilibria and the verification-
oriented aspects of secure equilibria. These different notions of equilibria are precisely
defined in Section 1.
In this paper, we address the following problems:
Problem 1. Given a multiplayer quantitative reachability game G, does there exist a Nash
(resp. secure, subgame perfect, subgame perfect secure) equilibrium in G?
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Problem 2. Given a Nash (resp. secure, subgame perfect, subgame perfect secure) equilib-
rium in a multiplayer quantitative reachability game G, does there exist such an equilibrium
with finite memory?
These questions have been positively solved by some of the authors in [BBDP10] for
Nash equilibria in multiplayer games, and for secure equilibria in two-player games. No-
tice that these problems and related ones have been investigated a lot in the qualitative
framework (see [GU08]).
Here we go a step further and establish the following results about subgame perfect
and secure equilibria:
• in every multiplayer quantitative reachability game, there exists a subgame perfect equi-
librium (Theorem 2.1),
• in every two-player quantitative reachability game, there exists a subgame perfect secure
equilibrium (Theorem 3.1),
• in every multiplayer quantitative reachability game, one can decide whether there exists
a secure equilibrium in ExpSpace (Theorem 4.1),
• if there exists a secure equilibrium in a multiplayer quantitative reachability game, then
there exists one that is finite-memory (Theorem 4.2).
The results in this paper first appeared in the proceedings of FoSSaCS 2012, [BBDPG12].
We here provide their complete proofs.
Related work. Several recent papers have considered two-player zero-sum games played
on finite graphs with regular objectives enriched by some quantitative aspects. Let us
mention some of them: games with finitary objectives [CH06], games with prioritized re-
quirements [AKW08], request-response games where the waiting times between the requests
and the responses are minimized [HTW08, Zim09], and games whose winning conditions
are expressed via quantitative languages [BCHJ09].
Other work concerns qualitative non zero-sum games. In [CHJ06] where the notion of
secure equilibrium has been introduced, it is proved that a unique maximal payoff profile of
secure equilibria always exists for two-player non zero-sum games with regular objectives.
In [GU08], general criteria ensuring existence of Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equi-
libria (resp. secure equilibria) are provided for multiplayer (resp. 2-player) games, as well as
complexity results. In [BBM10], the existence of Nash equilibria is studied for timed games
with qualitative reachability objectives. Complexity issues are discussed in [BBMU11] about
Nash equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with Bu¨chi objectives.
Finally, let us mention work that combines both quantitative and non zero-sum as-
pects. In [BG09], the authors study games played on graphs with terminal vertices where
quantitative payoffs are assigned to the players. These games may have cycles but all the
infinite plays form a single outcome (like in chess where every infinite play is a draw). That
paper gives criteria that ensure the existence of Nash (and subgame perfect) equilibria in
pure and memoryless strategies. In [KLST12], the studied games are played on priced
graphs similar to the ones considered in this article, however in a concurrent way. In this
concurrent framework, Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exist anymore. The authors
provide an algorithm to decide existence of Nash equilibria, thanks to a Bu¨chi automaton
accepting all Nash equilibria outcomes. The complexity of some related decision problems
is also studied. In [PS09], the authors study Muller games on finite graphs where players
have a preference ordering on the sets of the Muller table. They show that Nash equilibria
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always exist for such games, and that it is decidable whether there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium. In both cases they give a procedure to compute an equilibrium strategy profile
(when it exists). In [FKMY+10] (respectively [PS11]), it is shown that every multiplayer
sequential game has a subgame-perfect ǫ-equilibrium for every ǫ > 0 if the payoff functions
of the players are bounded and lower-semicontinuous (respectively upper-semicontinuous).
Organization of the paper. Section 1 is dedicated to definitions. We present the kinds
of games and equilibria that we study in this paper. In Section 2, we positively solve
Problem 1 for subgame perfect equilibria. In Section 3, this problem is also positively
solved for subgame perfect secure equilibria, but only in the two-player case. Finally, in
Section 4, we study Problems 1 and 2 in the context of secure equilibria. We partially solve
Problems 1 by providing an algorithm that decides the existence of a secure equilibrium.
And we positively solve Problem 2 for secure equilibria.
1. Preliminaries
1.1. Games, Strategy Profiles and Equilibria. In this paper, we distinguish between
qualitative and quantitative games. In a qualitative game, each player has a qualitative
objective, meaning that he wants to guarantee that some property holds. In this case, his
payoff for a play of the game is either 1 or 0 (the play does or does not satisfy the property,
respectively). On the other hand, in a quantitative game, each player has a quantitative
objective: he aims at minimizing (or maximizing) a certain value. His payoff for a play can
then be a real number or ±∞.
We consider here quantitative games played on a graph where all the players have
reachability objectives. It means that, given a certain set of vertices Goali, each player i
wants to reach one of these vertices as soon as possible. We recall the basic notions about
these games and we introduce different kinds of equilibria, like Nash equilibria. This section
is inspired from [BBDP10].
Definition 1.1. An infinite turn-based multiplayer quantitative reachability game is a tuple
G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E, (Goali)i∈Π) where
• Π is a finite set of players,
• G = (V, (Vi)i∈Π, E) is a finite directed graph where V is the set of vertices, (Vi)i∈Π is a
partition of V into the state sets of each player, E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges, such
that for all v ∈ V , there exists v′ ∈ V with (v, v′) ∈ E (i.e., each vertex has at least one
outgoing edge), and
• Goali ⊆ V is the non-empty goal set of player i.
From now on, we often use the term game to denote a multiplayer quantitative reachability
game according to Definition 1.1.
It is often useful to specify an initial vertex v0 ∈ V for a game G. We call the pair
(G, v0) an initialized game. Sometimes we omit the word “initialized” and just talk about
games. The game (G, v0) is played as follows. A token is first placed on the vertex v0.
Player i, such that v0 ∈ Vi, has to choose one of the outgoing edges of v0 and put the token
on the vertex v1 reached when following this edge. Then, it is the turn of the player who
owns v1. And so on.
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A play ρ ∈ V ω (resp. a history h ∈ V +) of (G, v0) is an infinite (resp. a finite) path
through the graph G starting from vertex v0. Note that a history is always non-empty
because it starts with v0. The set H ⊆ V
+ is made up of all the histories of G, and for
i ∈ Π, the set Hi is the set of all histories h ∈ H whose last vertex belongs to Vi.
For any play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . of G, we define Costi(ρ) the cost of player i as:
Costi(ρ) =
{
l if l is the least index such that ρl ∈ Goali,
+∞ otherwise.
(1.1)
We note Cost(ρ) = (Costi(ρ))i∈Π the cost profile for the play ρ. Each player i aims to
minimize the cost he has to pay, i.e. reach his goal set as soon as possible. The cost profile
for a history h is defined similarly.
A prefix (resp. proper prefix ) α of a history h = h0 . . . hk is a finite sequence h0 . . . hl,
with l ≤ k (resp. l < k), denoted by α ≤ h (resp. α < h). We similarly consider a prefix α
of a play ρ, denoted by α < ρ. The function Last returns, given a history h = h0 . . . hk,
the last vertex hk of h, and the length |h| of h is the number k of its edges. Note that the
length is not defined as the number of vertices. Given a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . ., we denote by ρ≤l
the prefix of ρ of length l, i.e. ρ≤l = ρ0ρ1 . . . ρl. Similarly, ρ<l = ρ0ρ1 . . . ρl−1.
We say that a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . visits a set S ⊆ V (resp. a vertex v ∈ V ) if there exists
l ∈ N such that ρl is in S (resp. ρl = v). The same terminology also stands for a history h.
More precisely, we say that ρ visits a set S at (resp. before) depth d ∈ N if ρd is in S (resp.
if there exists l ≤ d such that ρl is in S). For any play ρ we denote by Visit(ρ) the set of
players i ∈ Π such that ρ visits Goali. The set Visit(h) for a history h is defined similarly.
A strategy of player i in G is a function σ : Hi → V assigning to each history h ∈ Hi,
a next vertex σ(h) such that (Last(h), σ(h)) belongs to E. We say that a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . .
of G is consistent with a strategy σ of player i if ρk+1 = σ(ρ0 . . . ρk) for all k ∈ N such
that ρk ∈ Vi. The same terminology is used for a history h of G. A strategy profile of G
is a tuple (σi)i∈Π where σi is a strategy for player i. It determines a unique play in the
initialized game (G, v0) consistent with each strategy σi, called the outcome of (σi)i∈Π and
denoted by 〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0 . We write σ−j for (σi)i∈Π\{j}, the set of strategies σi for all the
players except for player j.
A strategy σ of player i is memoryless if σ depends only on the current vertex, i.e.
σ(h) = σ(Last(h)) for all h ∈ Hi. More generally, σ is a finite-memory strategy if the
equivalence relation ≈σ on H defined by h ≈σ h
′ if σ(hδ) = σ(h′δ) for all δ ∈ Hi has finite
index. In other words, a finite-memory strategy is a strategy that can be implemented by
a finite automaton with output. A strategy profile (σi)i∈Π is called memoryless or finite-
memory if each σi is a memoryless or a finite-memory strategy, respectively.
For a strategy profile (σi)i∈Π with outcome ρ and a strategy σ
′
j of player j, we say that
player j deviates from ρ if there exists a prefix h of ρ, consistent with σ′j , such that h ∈ Hj
and σ′j(h) 6= σj(h).
We now introduce different notions of equilibria in the quantitative framework and give
several examples to make clear the presented concepts. We first begin with the definition
of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.2. A strategy profile (σi)i∈Π of a game (G, v0) is a Nash equilibrium if for
every player j ∈ Π and every strategy σ′j of player j, we have:
Costj(ρ) ≤ Costj(ρ
′)
where ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0 and ρ
′ = 〈σ′j , σ−j〉v0 .
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This definition means that for all j ∈ Π, player j has no incentive to deviate since
he cannot strictly decrease his cost when using σ′j instead of σj . Keeping notations of
Definition 1.2 in mind, a strategy σ′j such that Costj(ρ) > Costj(ρ
′) is called a profitable
deviation for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π. In this case, either player j pays an infinite cost for ρ
and a finite cost for ρ′ (i.e. ρ′ visits Goalj , but ρ does not), or player j pays a finite cost
for ρ and a strictly lower cost for ρ′ (i.e. ρ′ visits Goalj for the first time earlier than ρ does).
We now define the concept of secure equilibrium1. We first need to associate a binary
relation ≺j on cost profiles with each player j. Given two cost profiles (xi)i∈Π and (yi)i∈Π:
(xi)i∈Π ≺j (yi)i∈Π iff
(
xj > yj
)
∨(
xj = yj ∧ (∀i ∈ Π xi ≤ yi) ∧ (∃i ∈ Π xi < yi)
)
.
We then say that player j prefers (yi)i∈Π to (xi)i∈Π. In other words, player j prefers a cost
profile to another one either if he has a strictly lower cost, or if he keeps the same cost, the
other players have a greater cost, and at least one has a strictly greater cost.
Definition 1.3. A strategy profile (σi)i∈Π of a game (G, v0) is a secure equilibrium if for
every player j ∈ Π, there does not exist any strategy σ′j of player j such that:
Cost(ρ) ≺j Cost(ρ
′)
where ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0 and ρ
′ = 〈σ′j , σ−j〉v0 .
In other words, player j has no incentive to deviate w.r.t. relation ≺j. A strategy σ
′
j
such that Cost(ρ) ≺j Cost(ρ
′) is called a ≺j-profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π.
Clearly, any secure equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
In a secure equilibrium, each player tries first to minimize his own cost, and then to
maximize the costs of the other players. According to [CHJ06], a secure profile can be seen
as a contract between the players which strengthens cooperation in the following sense: any
unilateral selfish deviation by one player cannot put the other players at a disadvantage
if they follow the contract. For more intuition and motivation about secure equilibria, see
[CHJ06, CH07, CR10].
We now introduce a third type of equilibrium: the subgame perfect equilibrium. In this
case, a strategy profile is not only required to be a Nash equilibrium from the initial vertex,
but also after every possible initial history of the game. Before giving the definition, we
introduce the concept of subgame and explain some notations.
Given a game G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E, (Goali)i∈Π), an initial vertex v0, and a history hv
of (G, v0), with v ∈ V (h might be empty), the subgame (G|h, v) of (G, v0) with history hv
is the game G|h = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E, (Goali)i∈Π) initialized at v and such that the cost of a
play π of (G|h, v) for player i is given by Costi(hπ). Notice that the only difference between
(G, v0) and (G|h, v) occurs in the costs of the plays. The cost for a play in the subgame
(G|h, v) depends on the considered history h (the goal set Goali could have already been
visited by h). Given a strategy σi for player i in G, we define the strategy σi|h in G|h
by σi|h(h
′) = σi(hh
′) for all histories h′ of (G|h, v) such that Last(h
′) ∈ Vi. Let σ be the
strategy profile (σi)i∈Π, we write σ|h for (σi|h)i∈Π, and h〈σ|h〉v for the play in (G, v0) with
prefix h that is consistent with σ|h from v.
1Our definition naturally extends the notion of secure equilibrium proposed in [CHJ06] to the quantitative
framework.
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Then, we say that (σi|h)i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium in the subgame (G|h, v) if for every
player j ∈ Π and every strategy σ′j of player j, we have that Costj(ρ) ≤ Costj(ρ
′), where
ρ = h〈(σi|h)i∈Π〉v and ρ
′ = h〈σ′j |h, σ−j |h〉v. The definition of a secure equilibrium in (G|h, v)
is given similarly.
A subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium after
every possible history of the game, i.e. in every subgame. In particular, a subgame perfect
equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.4. A strategy profile (σi)i∈Π of a game (G, v0) is a subgame perfect equilibrium
if for all histories hv of (G, v0), with v ∈ V , (σi|h)i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium in the subgame
(G|h, v).
We now introduce the last kind of equilibrium that we study. It is a new notion
that combines both concepts of subgame perfect equilibrium and secure equilibrium in the
following way.
Definition 1.5. A strategy profile (σi)i∈Π of a game (G, v0) is a subgame perfect secure
equilibrium if for all histories hv of (G, v0), with v ∈ V , (σi|h)i∈Π is a secure equilibrium in
the subgame (G|h, v).
Notice that a subgame perfect secure equilibrium is a secure equilibrium, as well as a
subgame perfect equilibrium.
In order to understand the differences between the various notions of equilibria, we
provide three simple examples of games limited to two players and to finite trees.
Example 1.6. Let G = (V, V1, V2, E,Goal1,Goal2) be the two-player game depicted in
Fig. 1. The vertices of player 1 (resp. 2) are represented by circles (resp. squares), that
is, V1 = {A,D,E, F} and V2 = {B,C}. The initial vertex v0 is A. The vertices of Goal1
are shaded whereas the vertices of Goal2 are doubly circled; thus Goal1 = {D,F} and
Goal2 = {F} in G. The number 2 labeling the edge (B,D) is a shortcut to indicate that
there are two consecutive edges from B to D (through one intermediate vertex). We will
keep these conventions throughout the article.
A
B C
D E F
2
Figure 1: Game G.
A
B C
D E F
Figure 2: Game G′.
A
B C
D E F
Figure 3: Game G′′.
In the games G, G′ and G′′ of Fig. 1, 2 and 3 (played on the same graph), we define two
strategies σ1, σ
′
1 of player 1 and two stategies σ2, σ
′
2 of player 2 in the following way:
σ1(A) = B, σ
′
1(A) = C, σ2(C) = E and σ
′
2(C) = F .
In (G, A), one can easily check that the strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is a secure equilibrium
(and thus a Nash equilibrium) with cost profile is (3,+∞). Such a secure equilibrium exists
because player 2 threatens player 1 to go to vertex E in the case where vertex C is reached.
This threat is not credible in this case since by acting this way, player 2 gets an infinite cost
instead of a cost of 2 (that he could obtain by reaching F ). For this reason, (σ1, σ2) is not a
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subgame perfect equilibrium (and thus not a subgame perfect secure equilibrium). However,
one can check that the strategy profile (σ′1, σ
′
2) is a subgame perfect secure equilibrium.
Let us now consider the game (G′, A) depicted in Fig. 2 (notice that the number 2 has
disappeared from the edge (B,D), but Goal1 and Goal2 remain the same). One can verify
that the strategy profile (σ′1, σ
′
2) is a subgame perfect equilibrium which is not a secure
equilibrium (and thus not a subgame perfect secure equilibrium). A subgame perfect secure
equilibrium for (G′, A) is given by the strategy profile (σ1, σ
′
2).
Finally, for the game (G′′, A) depicted in Fig. 3 (where Goal1 = {D,F} and Goal2 =
{E,F}), one can check that the strategy profile (σ1, σ
′
2) is both a subgame perfect equilib-
rium and a secure equilibrium. However it is not a subgame perfect secure equilibrium. In
particular, this shows that being a subgame perfect secure equilibrium is not equivalent to
be a subgame perfect equilibrium and a secure equilibrium. On the other hand, (σ1, σ2) is
a subgame perfect secure equilibrium in (G′′, A).
The general philosophy of our work is to investigate interesting concepts of equilibria in
multiplayer quantitative reachability games. In these games, each player aims at reaching
his goal set as soon as possible. Having that in mind, a play where a goal set is visited for
the first time after cycles were no new goal set is visited does not seem to be a desirable
behavior (see the definition of unnecessary cycle below). It appears thus reasonable to seek
equilibrium concepts with outcomes that do not present this undesirable feature.
Definition 1.7. Given a play ρ = αβρ˜ in a game (G, v0), such that β is non-empty,
Last(α) = Last(αβ), Visit(α) = Visit(αβ) and Visit(α) 6= Visit(ρ), the cycle β is called an
unnecessary cycle.
Example 1.8. Let us exhibit an example of this phenomenon on the two-player game
(G, A) depicted in Fig. 4 (we use the same conventions as in Example 1.6). For n > 0, let
us consider the play AnBω. Along this play, the cycles An−1, for n > 1, are unnecessary
cycles. Indeed, once Goal1 is visited (in A), looping n times on A just delays the apparition
of Goal2 (in B). However, for each n > 0, one can build a subgame perfect equilibrium
(σn1 , σ2) whose outcome is A
nBω and cost profile is (0, n), as follows:
σn1 (h) =
{
A if h = Aj , with j < n,
B otherwise.
This allows us to conclude that the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium does not prevent
the existence of outcomes with unnecessary cycles. We can notice that (σn1 , σ2) is not a
secure equilibrium, for all n > 0. However, we will see in the next example that secure
equilibria can also allow this kind of undesirable behaviors.
A B
Figure 4: Subgame perfect equilibrium with
outcome AnBω.
A B C
Figure 5: Secure equilibrium with outcome
AnBCω.
Let us consider the game of Fig. 5 initialized at A. For n > 1, the cycles An−1 are unnec-
essary along the play AnBCω. However, for each n > 0, we can build a secure equilibrium
ON (SUBGAME PERFECT) SECURE EQUILIBRIUM IN QUANTITATIVE REACHABILITY GAMES 9
(σn1 , σ
n
2 ) whose outcome is A
nBCω and cost profile is (n + 1, n + 1), as follows:
σn1 (h) =
{
A if h = Aj , with j < n,
B otherwise.
; σn2 (h) =
{
C if h = AnB,
A otherwise.
For each n > 0, the fact that (σn1 , σ
n
2 ) is a secure equilibrium is based on the following threat
of player 2 against player 1: player 2 pretends that he will only decide to visit vertex C if
player 1 has visited vertex A exactly n times. This behavior is not credible since player 2’s
interest is to reach vertex C as soon as possible. In other words, we have that (σn1 , σ
n
2 ) is
not a subgame perfect equilibrium (and thus not a subgame perfect secure equilibrium).
Those examples motivate the introduction of the notion of subgame perfect secure
equilibrium. We believe that this notion can help in avoiding the undesirable behaviors
of unnecessary cycles. More generally, a deeper understanding of the studied equilibria
whose outcomes have unnecessary cycles could be very useful. A more subtle example of a
three-player game will be discussed in Example 4.9.
In the sequel, we study and partially solve Problem 1 and Problem 2. The next three
sections contain useful material for the proofs of our results.
1.2. Qualitative Two-player Zero-sum Games. In this section we recall well-known
properties of qualitative two-player zero-sum games [Tho08]. They will be useful for our
proofs, especially in the context of deviations of a player with respect to a strategy profile:
we thus face a two-player zero-sum game where the player who deviates plays against the
coalition of the other players.
We first recall the notion of weak parity game.
Definition 1.9. A qualitative two-player zero-sum weak parity game is a tuple G = (V, V1, V2,
E, c) where
• G = (V, V1, V2, E) is a finite directed graph where V is the set of vertices, (V1, V2) is a
partition of V into the vertex sets of player 1 and player 2, and E ⊆ V × V is the set of
edges,
• c : V → N is the coloring function.
Player 1 (resp. player 2) wins a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ V
ω of the game G if the maximum color
in the sequence c(ρ0)c(ρ1)c(ρ2) . . . is even (resp. odd).
Given an initial vertex v0 ∈ V , the notions of play, history and strategy are the same
as the ones defined in Section 1.1. The game is said zero-sum because every play is won by
exactly one of the two players.
In zero-sum games, it is interesting to know if one of the players can play in such a way
that he is sure to win, however the other player plays. This is formalized with the notion of
winning strategy. A strategy σi for player i is a winning strategy from an initial vertex v if
all the plays of G starting from v that are consistent with σi are won by player i. If player i
has a winning strategy in G from v, we say that player i wins the game G from v. We say
that a game G is determined if for all v ∈ V , one of the two players has a winning strategy
from v.
Martin showed [Mar75] that every qualitative two-player zero-sum game with a Borel
type winning condition is determined. In particular, we have the following proposition:
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Proposition 1.10. [Tho08, Theorem 5] Let G = (V, V1, V2, E, c) be a qualitative two-player
zero-sum weak parity game. Then for all v ∈ V , one of the two players has a memoryless
winning strategy from v (in particular, G is determined).
We here consider three special cases of the weak parity condition: reachability, safety,
and reachability under safety conditions. A qualitative two-player zero-sum reachability
under safety game is denoted
G = (V, V1, V2, E,R, S)
where R,S ⊆ V and R 6= ∅. In such a game, player 1 wins a play ρ iff ρ visits R (i.e.,
∃i ρi ∈ R) while staying in S (i.e., ∀i ρi ∈ S). The reachability under safety condition
can be encoded with a weak parity condition by defining the coloring function c as follows:
c(v) = 3 if v 6∈ S, c(v) = 2 if v ∈ R and c(v) = 1 otherwise. Reachability games (resp.
safety games) are special cases of reachability under safety games G = (V, V1, V2, E,R, S)
where S = V (resp. R = V ). We can now state a corollary of Proposition 1.10.
Corollary 1.11. Let G = (V, V1, V2, E,R, S) be a qualitative two-player zero-sum reacha-
bility under safety game. Then the game G is determined and player 1 has a memoryless
strategy ν1 that enables him to reach R within |V | − 1 edges, while staying in S, from each
vertex v from which he wins the game.
In the sequel, we apply Corollary 1.11 on particular two-player games. Given a multi-
player quantitative reachability game G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E, (Goali)i∈Π) and a player i ∈ Π,
we denote by Gi = (V, Vi, V \ Vi, E,R, S) (or (Gi, R, S) in short) the qualitative two-player
zero-sum reachability under safety game associated with player i. This game is played on
the graph Gi = (V, Vi, V \ Vi, E), where player i plays against the coalition of all the other
players. Player i controls the vertices of Vi and the coalition those of V \ Vi; player i aims
at reaching R while staying in S, and the coalition wants to prevent this.
1.3. Unraveling. In the proofs of this article, it will be often useful to unravel the graph
G = (V, (Vi)i∈Π, E) from an initial vertex v0, which ends up in an infinite tree, denoted
by T . This tree can be seen as a new graph where the set of vertices is the set H of histories
of G, the initial vertex is v0, and a pair (h, hv) ∈ H ×H is an edge of T if (Last(h), v) ∈ E.
A history h is a vertex of player i in T if h ∈ Hi, and h belongs to the goal set of player i
if Last(h) ∈ Goali.
We denote by T the related game. This game T played on the unraveling T of G
from v0 is equivalent to the game (G, v0) played on the graph G in the following sense.
A play (ρ0)(ρ0ρ1)(ρ0ρ1ρ2) . . . in T induces a unique play ρ = ρ0ρ1ρ2 . . . in (G, v0), and
conversely. Thus, we denote a play in T by the respective play in (G, v0). The bijection
between plays of (G, v0) and plays of T allows us to use the same cost function Cost, and
to transform easily strategies in G to strategies in T (and conversely).
For practical reasons, we often consider equivalently T in our proofs instead of (G, v0),
and the equilibria defined in T are obviously equilibria in (G, v0). Moreover, figures given
in proofs to help the understanding roughly represent the unraveling T of G and plays in
game T .
We also need to study the tree T limited to a certain depth d ∈ N: we denote
by Truncd(T ) the truncated tree of T of depth d and Truncd(T ) the finite game played
on Truncd(T ). More precisely, the set of vertices of Truncd(T ) is the set of histories h ∈ H
of length ≤ d; the edges of Truncd(T ) are defined in the same way as for T , except that for
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the histories h of length d, there exists no edge (h, hv). A play ρ in Truncd(T ) corresponds
to a history of (G, v0) of length equal to d. The notions of cost and strategy are defined
exactly like in the game T , but limited to the depth d. For instance, a player pays an
infinite cost for a play ρ (of length d) if his goal set is not visited by ρ.
1.4. Kuhn’s Theorem. This section is devoted to the classical Kuhn’s theorem [Kuh53].
It claims the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium (resp. subgame perfect secure
equilibrium) in multiplayer games played on finite trees.
A preference relation is a total, reflexive and transitive binary relation.
Theorem 1.12 (Kuhn’s theorem). Let Γ be a finite tree and G a game played on Γ. For
each player i ∈ Π, let -i be a preference relation on cost profiles. Then there exists a
strategy profile (σi)i∈Π such that for every history hv of G, every player j ∈ Π, and every
strategy σ′j of player j in G, we have
Cost(ρ′) -j Cost(ρ)
where ρ = h〈(σi|h)i∈Π〉v and ρ
′ = h〈σ′j |h, σ−j |h〉v.
One can easily be convinced that the binary relation on cost profiles used to define the
notion of Nash equilibrium (see Definition 1.2) is total, reflexive and transitive. We thus
have the following corollary.
Corollary 1.13. Let (G, v0) be a game and T be the unraveling of G from v0. Let Truncd(T )
be the game played on the truncated tree of T of depth d ∈ N. Then there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium in Truncd(T ).
Let j be the relation defined by x j y iff x ≺j y or x = y, where ≺j is the relation
used in Definition 1.3. We notice that in the two-player case, this relation is total, reflexive
and transitive. However when there are more than two players, j is no longer total.
Nevertheless, it is proved in [LR09] that Kuhn’s theorem remains true when j is only
transitive. So, the next corollary holds.
Corollary 1.14. Let (G, v0) be a game and T be the unraveling of G from v0. Let Truncd(T )
be the game played on the truncated tree of T of depth d ∈ N. Then there exists a subgame
perfect secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ).
2. Existence of a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
In this section, we positively solve Problem 1 for subgame perfect equilibria.
Theorem 2.1. In every multiplayer quantitative reachability game, there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
The proof uses techniques completely different from the ones given in [BBDP10, BBDP11]
for the existence of Nash equilibria, and secure equilibria in two-player games.
Let (G, v0) be a game and T be the infinite game played on the unraveling T of G
from v0. Kuhn’s theorem (and in particular Corollary 1.13) guarantees the existence of a
subgame perfect equilibrium in each finite game Truncn(T ) for every depth n ∈ N. Given
a sequence of such equilibria, the keypoint is to derive the existence of a subgame perfect
equilibrium in the infinite game T . This is possible by the following lemma.
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Lemma 2.2. Let (σn)n∈N be a sequence of strategy profiles such that for every n ∈ N, σ
n
is a strategy profile in the truncated game Truncn(T ). Then there exists a strategy profile
σ⋆ in the game T with the property:
∀d ∈ N, ∃n ≥ d, σ⋆ and σn coincide on histories of length up to d. (2.1)
Proof. This result is a direct consequence of the compactness of the set of infinite trees with
bounded outdegree [Kec95]. An alternative proof is as follows. We give a tree structure,
denoted by Γ, to the set of all strategy profiles in the games Truncn(T ), n ∈ N: the nodes
of Γ are the strategy profiles, and we draw an edge from a strategy profile σ in Truncn(T )
to a strategy profile σ′ in Truncn+1(T ) if and only if σ is the restriction of σ
′ to histories of
length less than n. It means that the nodes at depth d correspond to strategy profiles of
Truncd(T ). We then consider the tree Γ
′ derived from Γ where we only keep the nodes σn,
n ∈ N, and their ancestors. Since Γ′ has finite outdegree, it has an infinite path by Ko¨nig’s
lemma. This path goes through infinitely many nodes that are ancestors of nodes in the
set {σn, n ∈ N}. Therefore there exists a strategy profile σ⋆ in the infinite game T (given
by the previous infinite path in Γ′) with property (2.1).
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E, (Goali)i∈Π) be a multiplayer quantitative
reachability game, v0 be an initial vertex, and T be the game played on the unraveling of
G from v0. For all n ∈ N, we consider the finite game Truncn(T ) and get a subgame perfect
equilibrium σn = (σni )i∈Π in this game by Corollary 1.13. According to Lemma 2.2, there
exists a strategy profile σ⋆ in the game T with property (2.1).
It remains to show that σ⋆ is a subgame perfect equilibrium in T , and thus in (G, v0). Let
hv be a history of the game (with v ∈ V ). We have to prove that σ⋆|h is a Nash equilibrium
in the subgame (T |h, v). As a contradiction, suppose that there exists a profitable deviation
σ′j for some player j ∈ Π w.r.t. σ
⋆|h in (T |h, v). This means that Costj(ρ) > Costj(ρ
′) for
ρ = h〈σ⋆|h〉v and ρ
′ = h〈σ′j |h, σ
⋆
−j|h〉v , that is, ρ
′ visits Goalj for the first time at a certain
depth d, such that |h| < d < +∞, and ρ visits Goalj at a depth strictly greater than d (see
Figure 6). Thus:
Costj(ρ) > Costj(ρ
′) = d.
T (T |h,v)
d
n
v
h
ρρ′
Goalj
π′ π
Figure 6: The game T with its subgame (T |h, v).
According to property (2.1), there exists n ≥ d such that σ⋆ coincide with σn on histories
of length up to d. It follows that for π = h〈σn|h〉v and π
′ = h〈σ′j |h, σ
n
−j |h〉v , we have that
(see Figure 6)
Costj(π
′) = Costj(ρ
′) = d and Costj(π) > d,
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as π′ and ρ′ coincide up to depth d. And so, σ′j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t.
σn|h in (Truncn(T )|h, v), which leads to a contradiction with the fact that σ
n is a subgame
perfect equilibrium in Truncn(T ) by hypothesis.
As an extension, we consider multiplayer quantitative reachability games with tuples of
costs on edges (as in [BBDP11]). In these games, we assume that edges are labelled with
tuples of strictly positive costs (one cost for each player). Here we do not only count the
number of edges to reach the goal of a player, but we sum up his costs along the path until
his goal is reached. His aim is still to minimize his global cost for a play. Let us give the
formal definition.
Definition 2.3. A multiplayer quantitative reachability game with tuples of costs on edges
is a tuple G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E, (Costi)i∈Π, (Goali)i∈Π) where
• Π is a finite set of players,
• G = (V, (Vi)i∈Π, E) is a finite directed graph where V is the set of vertices, (Vi)i∈Π is a
partition of V into the state sets of each player, and E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges, such
that for all v ∈ V , there exists v′ ∈ V with (v, v′) ∈ E,
• Costi : E → R
>0 is the cost function of player i defined on the edges of the graph,
• Goali ⊆ V is the non-empty goal set of player i.
In this context, we adapt the definition of Costi(ρ), the cost of player i for a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . :
Costi(ρ) =


l∑
k=1
Costi((ρk−1, ρk)) if l is the least index such that ρl ∈ Goali,
+∞ otherwise.
(2.2)
In this framework, we also prove the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium. The proof
is similar to the one of Theorem 2.1, the only difference lies in the choice of the considered
depth d.
Theorem 2.4. In every multiplayer quantitative reachability game with tuples of costs on
edges, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Let us introduce some notations that will be useful for the proof of this theorem. We
define cmin := mini∈Πmine∈E Costi(e), cmax := maxi∈Πmaxe∈E Costi(e) and K :=
⌈
cmax
cmin
⌉
. It
is clear that cmin, cmax > 0 and K ≥ 1.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. Let G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E, (Costi)i∈Π, (Goali)i∈Π) be a multiplayer
quantitative reachability game with tuples of costs on edges, v0 be an initial vertex, and
T be the game played on the unraveling of G from v0. For all n ∈ N, we consider the
finite game Truncn(T ) and get a subgame perfect equilibrium σ
n = (σni )i∈Π in this game by
Corollary 1.13. According to Lemma 2.2, there exists a strategy profile σ⋆ in the game T
with property (2.1).
We then show that σ⋆ is a subgame perfect equilibrium in T , and thus in (G, v0). Let
hv be a history of the game (v ∈ V ). We have to prove that σ⋆|h is a Nash equilibrium in
the subgame (T |h, v). As a contradiction, suppose that there exists a profitable deviation
σ′j for some player j ∈ Π w.r.t. σ
⋆|h in (T |h, v). This means that Costj(ρ) > Costj(ρ
′) for
ρ = h〈σ⋆|h〉v and ρ
′ = h〈σ′j |h, σ
⋆
−j|h〉v . Thus ρ
′ visits Goalj for the first time at a certain
depth d′, such that |h| < d′ < +∞.
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We define some depth d depending on the fact that ρ visits Goalj or not.
d =
{
max{d′, d′′} if ρ visits Goalj for the first time at depth d
′′,
d′ · K if ρ does not visit Goalj.
According to property (2.1), there exists n ≥ d such that σ⋆ coincide with σn on histories
of length up to d. For π = h〈σn|h〉v and π
′ = h〈σ′j |h, σ
n
−j |h〉v, since d ≥ d
′, it follows that:
Costj(π
′) = Costj(ρ
′).
If ρ visits Goalj, then it holds that Costj(π) = Costj(ρ) by definition of d, and so
Costj(π) > Costj(π
′). If ρ does not visit Goalj, then the following inequalities hold:
Costj(π
′) ≤ d′ · cmax ≤ d · cmin < Costj(π).
The first inequality comes from the fact that π′ visits Goalj at depth d
′, the second one
from the definition of d, and the last one from the fact that if π visits Goalj, it must happen
after depth d (as ρ does not visit Goalj).
In both cases Costj(π) > Costj(π
′), and we conclude that σ′j is a profitable deviation
for player j w.r.t. σn|h in (Truncn(T )|h, v), which leads to a contradiction with the fact
that σn is a subgame perfect equilibrium in Truncn(T ) by hypothesis.
Remark 2.5. We can transform the cost functions (Costi)i∈Π ((1.1) or (2.2)) of our games
in the following way: for any player i and any play ρ,
Cost
′
i(ρ) =
{
1− 1
c+1 if Costi(ρ) = c ∈ R
+,
1 if Costi(ρ) = +∞.
These new cost functions (Cost′i)i∈Π are bounded and continuous (in the product topology on
V ω). Moreover, a subgame perfect equilibrium in a game with the cost functions (Costi)i∈Π
is a subgame perfect equilibrium in this game with the new cost functions (Cost′i)i∈Π, and
conversely. Then, Theorems 2.1 and 2.4 are consequences of [Har85, FL83].
3. Existence of a Subgame Perfect Secure Equilibrium
Regarding subgame perfect secure equilibria, we positively solve Problem 1 but only in the
case of two-player games.
Theorem 3.1. In every two-player quantitative reachability game, there exists a subgame
perfect secure equilibrium.
The main ideas of the proof are similar to the ones for Theorem 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let G = (Π, V, V1, V2, E,Goal1,Goal2) be a two-player quantitative
reachability game, v0 be an initial vertex, and T be the game played on the unraveling of G
from v0. For every n ∈ N, we consider the finite game Truncn(T ) and get a subgame perfect
secure equilibrium σn = (σn1 , σ
n
2 ) in this game by Corollary 1.14. According to Lemma 2.2
there exists a strategy profile σ⋆ in the game T such that σ⋆ has property (2.1).
We show that σ⋆ = (σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2) is a subgame perfect secure equilibrium in T . Let hv be
a history of the game (v ∈ V ). We have to prove that σ⋆|h is a secure equilibrium in the
subgame (T |h, v). As a contradiction, suppose that there exists a ≺j-profitable deviation
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σ′j for some player j ∈ {1, 2} w.r.t. σ
⋆|h in (T |h, v). Let us assume w.l.o.g. that j = 1. As
σ⋆|h is a Nash equilibrium in (T |h, v) (see the proof of Theorem 2.1), we know that
Cost1(ρ) = Cost1(ρ
′) and Cost2(ρ) < Cost2(ρ
′) (3.1)
where ρ = h〈σ⋆1 |h, σ
⋆
2 |h〉v and ρ
′ = h〈σ′1|h, σ
⋆
2 |h〉v . Thus it implies that Cost2(ρ) is finite. Let
d be the maximum between Cost1(ρ) and Cost2(ρ) if Cost1(ρ) is finite, or Cost2(ρ) otherwise.
Remark that d > |h|. According to property (2.1), there exists n ≥ d such that the strategy
profiles σ⋆ and σn coincide on histories of length up to d.
Let us show that σ′1 would then be a ≺1-profitable deviation for player 1 w.r.t. σ
n|h in
(Truncn(T )|h, v). In this aim we first prove that
Cost2(π) < Cost2(π
′) (3.2)
where π = h〈σn1 |h, σ
n
2 |h〉v and π
′ = h〈σ′1|h, σ
n
2 |h〉v are finite plays in Truncn(T ) (see Fig. 7).
By definition of d and according to property (2.1), we have that Cost2(π) = Cost2(ρ) ≤ d.
If Cost2(ρ
′) = Cost2(π
′), Equation (3.1) implies that Cost2(π) < Cost2(π
′). Otherwise, we
have that Cost2(π
′) > d as ρ′ and π′ coincide until depth d (by property (2.1)), and then
Cost2(π) ≤ d < Cost2(π
′).
T (T |h,v)
d
n
v
h
ρ
Goal2
ρ′
π′ π
Figure 7: The game T with its subgame (T |h, v).
We now consider Cost1(π) and Cost1(π
′). Let us study the next two cases.
• If Cost1(ρ) < +∞, then we have that
Cost1(π) = Cost1(π
′) (3.3)
because Cost1(ρ
′) = Cost1(ρ) = Cost1(π) = Cost1(π
′) ≤ d by Equation (3.1), prop-
erty (2.1) and definition of d.
• If Cost1(ρ) = +∞, then we show that Cost1(π) = +∞, and as a consequence we get that
Cost1(π) ≥ Cost1(π
′). (3.4)
As a contradiction suppose that Cost1(π) < +∞. Consider vertex ρd, the first vertex
of ρ that belongs to Goal2 (we recall that Cost2(ρ) = d). Suppose that player 1 has
a winning strategy to reach his goal from vertex ρd in the zero-sum reachability game
G1 = (G1,Goal1, V ) (as defined in Section 1.2). Then this contradicts the fact that σ
⋆
is a subgame perfect equilibrium in T (see the proof of Theorem 2.1). Therefore, by
determinacy of G1 (Corollary 1.11), player 2 has a winning strategy from vertex ρd to
prevent player 1 from reaching Goal1. But in this case, this strategy is a ≺2-profitable
deviation w.r.t. σn|h in (Truncn(T )|h, v), because player 2 can keep his cost while strictly
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increasing player 1’s cost. This is impossible as σn is a subgame perfect secure equilibrium
in Truncn(T ). Thus, we must have that Cost1(π) = +∞.
In all possible situations, we proved that σ′1 is a ≺1-profitable deviation for player 1 w.r.t.
σn|h in (Truncn(T )|h, v) because either Cost1(π) = Cost1(π
′) and Cost2(π) < Cost2(π
′), or
Cost1(π) > Cost1(π
′) (see (3.2–3.4)). So we get a contradiction with the fact that σn is a
subgame perfect secure equilibrium in Truncn(T ) by hypothesis.
Unfortunately the proof does not seem to extend to the multiplayer case. Indeed we
face the same kind of problems encountered in [BBDP10, BBDP11], where the existence of
secure equilibria is proved for two-player games and left open for multiplayer games.
4. Decidability of the Existence of a Secure Equilibrium
In this section, we study Problems 1 and 2 in the context of secure equilibria. Both problems
have been positively solved in [BBDP10] for two-player games only. To the best of our
knowledge, the existence of secure equilibria in the multiplayer framework is still an open
problem. We here provide an algorithm that decides the existence of a secure equilibrium.
We also show that if there exists a secure equilibrium, then there exists one that is finite-
memory.
Theorem 4.1. In every multiplayer quantitative reachability game, one can decide whether
there exists a secure equilibrium in ExpSpace.
Theorem 4.2. If there exists a secure equilibrium in a multiplayer quantitative reachability
game, then there exists one that is finite-memory.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is inspired from ideas developed in [BBDP10, BBDP11]. The
keypoint is to show that the existence of a secure equilibrium in a game (G, v0) is equivalent
to the existence of a secure equilibrium (with two additional properties) in the finite game
Truncd(T ) for a well-chosen depth d. The existence of the latter equilibrium is decidable.
Notice that by Corollary 1.14 a secure equilibrium always exists in Truncd(T ); however we
do not know if a secure equilibrium with the two required additional properties always exists
in Truncd(T ).
Let us formally introduce these two properties. The first one requires that the secure
equilibrium is goal-optimized, meaning that all the goal sets visited along its outcome are
visited for the first time before a certain given depth. For any game G played on a graph
with |V | vertices by |Π| players, we fix the following constant: dgoal(G) := 2 · |Π| · |V |.
Definition 4.3. Given a game (G, v0) and a strategy profile (σi)i∈Π in G, with outcome ρ,
we say that (σi)i∈Π is goal-optimized if and only if for all i ∈ Π such that Costi(ρ) < +∞,
we have that Costi(ρ) < dgoal(G).
The second property asks for a secure equilibrium that is deviation-optimized, meaning
that whenever a player deviates from its outcome, he realizes within a certain given number
of steps that his deviation is not profitable for him.
Definition 4.4. Given a game (G, v0) and a secure equilibrium (σi)i∈Π in G, with outcome
ρ, we say that (σi)i∈Π is deviation-optimized if and only if for every player j ∈ Π and every
strategy σ′j of player j, we have that
Cost(ρ<ddev ) 6≺j Cost(ρ
′
<ddev
),
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where ddev = max{Costi(ρ) | Costi(ρ) < +∞}+ |V | and ρ
′ = 〈σ′j , σ−j〉v0 .
Remark that Definitions 4.3 and 4.4 extend to games Truncd(T ) where d ≥ dgoal(G).
We can now state the key proposition for proving Theorems 4.1 and 4.2.
Proposition 4.5. Let (G, v0) be a game, and d = dgoal(G) + 3 · |V |.
(1) If there exists a goal-optimized and deviation-optimized secure equilibrium in
Truncd(T ), then there exists a secure equilibrium in (G, v0) that is finite-memory.
(2) If there exists a secure equilibrium in (G, v0), then there exists a goal-optimized and
deviation-optimized secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ).
At this stage, it is difficult to give some intuition about the choice of the values dgoal(G),
ddev and d = dgoal(G) + 3 · |V |. These values are linked to the proofs contained in this
section.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By Proposition 4.5, there exists a secure equilibrium in (G, v0) iff
there exists a goal-optimized and deviation-optimized secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ), with
d = dgoal(G) + 3 · |V |. The latter property is decidable in NExpSpace (in |V | and |Π|).
Indeed, Truncd(T ) has an exponential size. Guessing a strategy profile (σi)i∈Π in this tree
also needs an exponential size. Then we can test in exponential size whether (σi)i∈Π is
a goal-optimized and deviation-optimized secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ). By Savitch’s
theorem, deciding the existence of a secure equilibria is thus in ExpSpace.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. This theorem is a direct consequence of Proposition 4.5. Indeed
consider a secure equilibrium in a game (G, v0). We first apply Proposition 4.5 (Part (ii))
to this strategy profile to get a goal-optimized and deviation-optimized secure equilibrium
(σi)i∈Π in Truncd(T ), for d = dgoal(G) + 3 · |V |. Then we apply Proposition 4.5 (Part (i))
to the equilibrium (σi)i∈Π, to get a finite-memory secure equilibrium back in (G, v0).
Let us remark that in Theorem 4.2, the finite-memory secure equilibrium is created
from the one given by hypothesis and the construction is made in such a way that the set
of players whose goal set is visited along the outcome is the same for both equilibria.
The proof of Proposition 4.5 is long and technical. The next two sections are devoted
to the two parts of this proposition.
4.1. Part (i) of Proposition 4.5. This section is devoted to the proof of Proposition 4.5,
Part (i). We begin with a useful characterisation of a deviation-optimized secure equilib-
rium.
Lemma 4.6. With the previous notations of Definition 4.4, a secure equilibrium (σi)i∈Π is
deviation-optimized if and only if for every player j ∈ Π and every strategy σ′j of player j,
if
(1) Costj(ρ) = Costj(ρ
′),
(2) ∀ i ∈ Π such that Costi(ρ) < +∞, we have that Costi(ρ) ≤ Costi(ρ
′),
(3) ∃ i ∈ Π Costi(ρ) < Costi(ρ
′),
then there exists l ∈ Π such that Costl(ρ) = +∞ and Costl(ρ
′) < ddev.
Proof. Let us first assume that (σi)i∈Π is a deviation-optimized secure equilibrium whose
outcome is denoted by ρ. Given any player j ∈ Π, let σ′j be a strategy fulfilling the
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hypotheses of the lemma and ρ′ the outcome given by 〈σ′j, σ−j〉v0 . Let us denote respectively
by (xi)i∈Π and (yi)i∈Π the cost profiles of the histories ρ<ddev and ρ
′
<ddev
.
Notice that by definition of ddev, Costi(ρ) = xi for all i. For ρ
′, we have Costi(ρ
′) = yi
provided Costi(ρ
′) < ddev. Otherwise, it may happen that yi = +∞ and Costi(ρ
′) < +∞.
So, it holds that Costi(ρ
′) ≤ yi for all i. These observations will be often used in the sequel
of the proof.
Since (σi)i∈Π is deviation-optimized, we have Cost(ρ<ddev ) 6≺j Cost(ρ
′
<ddev
) meaning
that: (
xj ≤ yj
)
∧
(
xj 6= yj ∨ (∃i ∈ Π xi > yi) ∨ (∀i ∈ Π xi ≥ yi)
)
. (4.1)
By hypothesis (i), xj = yj. By hypothesis (iii), we cannot have ∀i ∈ Π xi ≥ yi. Therefore
to satisfy (4.1), there must exist a player i such that xi > yi. If Costi(ρ) < +∞, then
by definition of ddev, Costi(ρ) = xi > yi = Costi(ρ
′) in contradiction with hypothesis (ii).
Therefore Costi(ρ) = +∞. From xi > yi, it follows that Costi(ρ
′) < ddev, which concludes
the first implication of the proof.
For the converse, let us now assume that (σi)i∈Π is a secure equilibrium that fulfills the
property stated in Lemma 4.6. We will prove that it is deviation-optimized, that is, for any
player j ∈ Π, and any deviation σ′j of player j, we have that Cost(ρ<ddev ) 6≺j Cost(ρ
′
<ddev
),
with ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0 and ρ
′ = 〈σ′j , σ−j〉v0 . By denoting respectively by (xi)i∈Π and (yi)i∈Π
the cost profiles of ρ<ddev and ρ
′
<ddev
, it is equivalent to prove (4.1).
Since (σi)i∈Π is a secure equilibrium, we know that σ
′
j is not a ≺j-profitable deviation.
In particular, player j can not strictly decrease his cost along ρ′, and thus xj ≤ yj. It
remains to prove that the second conjunct of (4.1) is true. For this, we first show that
as soon as one of the hypotheses among (i), (ii) or (iii) is not fulfilled, this conjunct is
satisfied.
• If Costj(ρ) < Costj(ρ
′), by choice of ddev, we also have that xj < yj . Moreover, the case
Costj(ρ) > Costj(ρ
′) is not possible as (σi)i∈Π is a secure equilibrium.
• If there exists i ∈ Π such that Costi(ρ) < +∞ and Costi(ρ) > Costi(ρ
′), then xi > yi.
• If for all i ∈ Π, Costi(ρ) ≥ Costi(ρ
′), we also have that xi ≥ yi, for all i.
Thus the remaining deviations to consider fulfill hypotheses (i), (ii) and (iii). In this case,
there exists l ∈ Π such that Costl(ρ) = +∞ and Costl(ρ
′) < ddev. In particular we have
that xl > yl, and the second conjunct of (4.1) is true.
The ideas of the proof for Part (i) of Proposition 4.5 are as follows. Suppose that there
exists a goal-optimized and deviation-optimized secure equilibrium (σi)i∈Π in Truncd(T ),
for d = dgoal(G) + 3 · |V |. To get from (σi)i∈Π a finite-memory secure equilibrium in (G, v0),
we use a similar construction as [BBDP11, Proposition 25] where it is shown, in the context
of two-player games, how to extend a secure equilibrium in a finite truncation of (G, v0) to
a secure equilibrium in (G, v0). The rough idea is as follows. Due to the hypotheses, the
outcome π of (σi)i∈Π has a prefix αβ such that all goal sets visited by π are already visited
by α, and such that β is a cycle. The required secure equilibrium is specified such that its
outcome is equal to αβω and any deviating player is punished by the coalition of the other
players in a way that this deviation is not profitable for him. This secure equilibrium can
be constructed in a way to be finite-memory.
Proof of Proposition 4.5, Part (i). Let us set Π = {1, . . . , n}. Let (τi)i∈Π be a goal-optimized
and deviation-optimized secure equilibrium in the game Truncd(T ) and π its outcome. Since
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|π| = dgoal(G) + 3 · |V |, we can write
π = αβγ with β non-empty
Last(α) = Last(αβ)
|α| ≥ dgoal(G) + |V |
|αβ| ≤ dgoal(G) + 2 · |V | .
We have that Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ) (no new goal set is visited after α) because |α| ≥ dgoal(G)
and (τi)i∈Π is goal-optimized. This enables us to use [BBDP11, Lemma 15] as follows. Let
j ∈ Π be such that α does not visit Goalj , and suppose that player j deviates from the history
α. This lemma states that for all histories hv consistent with τ−j and such that |hv| ≤ |αβ|,
then the coalition formed by all the players i ∈ Π \ {j} can play to prevent player j from
reaching his goal set Goalj from vertex v. It means that this coalition has a memoryless
winning strategy νv−j from vertex v in the zero-sum reachability game Gj = (Gj ,Goalj , V )
(see Corollary 1.11). For each player i 6= j, let νvi,j be the memoryless strategy of player i
in G induced by νv−j .
We define a finite-memory secure equilibrium in the game T using the same idea as in
the proof of [BBDP11, Proposition 25]. The idea is to specify the required secure equilibrium
as follows: each player i plays according to αβω (which is the outcome of this equilibrium)
and punishes player j 6= i if he deviates from αβω, by playing according to τi until depth
|α|, and after that, by playing arbitrarily if α visits Goalj , and according to ν
v
i,j otherwise
(where v is the vertex visited at depth |α| when deviating).
Formally we first need to specify a punishment function P . For the initial vertex v0,
we define P (v0) = ⊥ and for all histories hv ∈ H such that h ∈ Hi, we let:
P (hv) :=


⊥ if P (h) = ⊥ and hv < αβω,
i if P (h) = ⊥ and hv 6< αβω,
P (h) otherwise (P (h) 6= ⊥).
Then the definition of the secure equilibrium (σi)i∈Π in T is as follows. For all i ∈ Π and
h ∈ Hi,
σi(h) :=


v if P (h) = ⊥ (h < αβω); such that hv < αβω,
arbitrary if P (h) = i,
τi(h) if P (h) 6= ⊥, i and |h| < |α|,
νv
i,P (h)(h) if P (h) 6= ⊥, i, |h| ≥ |α|, α does not visit GoalP (h);
such that ∃h′v ≤ h with |h′v| = |α|,
arbitrary otherwise (P (h) 6= ⊥, i, |h| ≥ |α| and α visits GoalP (h)),
where arbitrary means that the next vertex is chosen arbitrarily (in a memoryless way).
Clearly the outcome of (σi)i∈Π is the play αβ
ω.
Let us show that (σi)i∈Π is a secure equilibrium in the game T . Assume by contradiction
that there exists a ≺j-profitable deviation σ
′
j for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π in T . Let τ
′
j be
the strategy σ′j restricted to Truncd(T ). We are going to show that τ
′
j is a ≺j-profitable
deviation for player j w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π in Truncd(T ), which is impossible by hypothesis. Here
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are some useful notations:
π = 〈(τi)i∈Π〉v0 of cost profile (x1, . . . , xn)
π′ = 〈τ ′j, τ−j〉v0 of cost profile (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n)
ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0 of cost profile (y1, . . . , yn)
ρ′ = 〈σ′j , σ−j〉v0 of cost profile (y
′
1, . . . , y
′
n).
Notice that the play π′ coincide with the play ρ′ at least until depth |α| (by definition of
τ ′j and σ−j); they can differ afterwards. Clearly π and ρ coincide at least until depth |αβ|.
The situation is depicted in Fig. 8.
|α|
α
d
β
β
β
β
β
β
π
(xi)i∈Π
π′
(x′i)i∈Π
ρ
(yi)i∈Π
ρ′
(y′i)i∈Π
Figure 8: Plays π and ρ, and their respective deviations π′ and ρ′.
As σ′j is a ≺j-profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π, we have that
(y1, . . . , yn) ≺j (y
′
1, . . . , y
′
n). (4.2)
Let us show that τ ′j is a ≺j-profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π, i.e.,
(x1, . . . , xn) ≺j (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n).
By (4.2), one of the next three cases stands.
(1) y′j < yj < +∞.
As ρ = αβω and Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ), it means that α visits Goalj, and then yj = xj .
Since y′j < |α|, we also have x
′
j = y
′
j (as π
′ and ρ′ coincide until depth |α|). Therefore
x′j < xj , and (x1, . . . , xn) ≺j (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n).
(2) y′j < yj = +∞.
If y′j ≤ |α|, we have again x
′
j = y
′
j. Since Visit(α) = Visit(π), it follows that xj =
yj = +∞. Thus x
′
j < xj , and so (x1, . . . , xn) ≺j (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n).
We show that the case y′j > |α| is impossible. By definition of σ−j, the play ρ
′ is
consistent with τ−j until depth |α|, and then with ν
v
−j from ρ
′
|α| (as yj = +∞). The
play ρ′ cannot visit Goalj after a depth > |α| by definition of ν
v
−j.
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(3) yj = y
′
j, ∀i ∈ Π yi ≤ y
′
i and ∃ i ∈ Π yi < y
′
i.
The fact that yj = y
′
j implies yj = xj ≥ x
′
j (as Visit(α) = Visit(π)). If x
′
j < xj, then
(x1, . . . , xn) ≺j (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n).
We show that the case x′j = xj is impossible. We can show that for all i ∈ Π such
that xi < +∞, we have xi ≤ x
′
i, and that there exists i ∈ Π such that xi < x
′
i. Since
(τi)i∈Π is deviation-optimized, Lemma 4.6 implies that there exists some l ∈ Π such that
xl = +∞, and x
′
l < ddev = max{xi | xi < +∞}+ |V |. As (τi)i∈Π is also goal-optimized,
we have that ddev ≤ dgoal(G) + |V | ≤ |α|. As ρ
′ is consistent with τ−j until depth |α|, it
follows that y′l = x
′
l < yl = xl = +∞. Thus case (3) is impossible.
Therefore, each case is either impossible or shows that (xi)i∈Π ≺j (x
′
i)i∈Π. This is in
contradiction with (τi)i∈Π being a secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ), and therefore, (σi)i∈Π
is a secure equilibrium in T , thus in (G, v0).
It remains to show that (σi)i∈Π is a finite-memory strategy profile. This proof is very
similar to the proof of [BBDP11, Proposition 25] and thus is not given in details. Roughly
speaking, a finite amount of memory is enough to produce the outcome αβω; outside of
this outcome it is enough to remember how (σi)i∈Π is defined for histories up to length |α|
(after depth |α|, memoryless strategies are used).
Remark 4.7. This proof shows in fact a little stronger result: if there exists a goal-
optimized and deviation-optimized secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ), then there exists a
finite-memory secure equilibrium in (G, v0) with the same cost profile.
4.2. Part (ii) of Proposition 4.5. Part (ii) of Proposition 4.5 states that if there exists
a secure equilibrium in a game (G, v0), then there exists a goal-optimized and deviation-
optimized secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ), for d = dgoal(G) + 3 · |V |. The proof needs
several steps. Suppose that there exists a secure equilibrium (σi)i∈Π in (G, v0). The first
step consists in transforming (σi)i∈Π into a goal-optimized and deviation-optimized secure
equilibrium in (G, v0) (Proposition 4.8); the second step in showing that its restriction to
Truncd(T ) with d = dgoal(G)+3 · |V | is still a goal-optimized and deviation-optimized secure
equilibrium in Truncd(T ).
Proposition 4.8. If there exists a secure equilibrium in a game (G, v0), then there exists
one in (G, v0) which is goal-optimized and deviation-optimized.
To get a goal-optimized equilibrium, the idea is to eliminate some unnecessary cycles
(see Definition 1.7). Such an idea has already been developed in [BBDP11, Lemma 19] for
Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, this lemma cannot be applied for secure equilibria (as shown
in Example 4.9). Adapting it to the context of secure equilibria is not trivial, the underlying
constructions are more involved: we need to modify the strategies of the coalition against a
deviating player. By using specific punishing strategies for the coalitions, we are then able
to get a goal-optimized equilibrium that is also deviation-optimized, due to the particular
form of these strategies.
Example 4.9. Consider the three-player game of Fig. 9 initialized at A, where V1 =
{A,C,D}, V2 = {B} and V3 = ∅, Goal1 = Goal2 = {A} and Goal3 = {D}. The strategy
profile (σ1, σ2, σ3) defined
2 below is a secure equilibrium whose outcome is ABCBDω and
2The stategy σ3 of player 3 has not to be defined as V3 = ∅.
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cost profile (0, 0, 5):
σ1(h) =
{
B if h = A or ABC,
D otherwise.
; σ2(h) =
{
C if h = AB,
D otherwise.
In Example 1.8, we gave two equilibria whose outcome has unnecessary cycles. Here, we also
face such a situation, with the cycle BCB. If we modify (σ1, σ2, σ3) in order to remove this
cycle, as done in [BBDP11, Lemma 19] for Nash equilibria, the resulting strategy profile is
a Nash equilibrium with outcome ABDω and cost profile (0, 0, 3), however it is no longer a
secure equilibrium. Indeed player 1 has a ≺1-profitable deviation by taking the edge (A,D)
instead of (A,B), which leads to a cost of 4 for player 3 (instead of 3). In the sequel we
show how to modify the approach of [BBDP11, Lemma 19] in a way to keep the property
of secure equilibrium.
A B C
D
4 2
Figure 9: A three-player game with Goal1 = Goal2 = {A} and Goal3 = {D}.
In order to prove Proposition 4.8, we need three lemmas: Lemmas 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13.
Given a secure equilibrium, Lemma 4.11 describes some particular memoryless strategies
for the coalition when a player deviates. Lemma 4.12 (counterpart of [BBDP11, Lemma
19] for secure equilibria) states that we can remove a cycle from the outcome of a secure
equilibrium, but the strategies have to be somewhat modified with these specific coalition
strategies. This lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 4.8 to get a goal-optimized
secure equilibrium. Lemma 4.13 states that we can also get a deviation-optimized secure
equilibrium.
Memoryless coalition strategies. Given a secure equilibrium in a game (G, v0), we here
prove the existence of interesting memoryless strategies for the coalition against a deviating
player.
Let us first introduce the definition of a j-promising history for some deviating player j.
Intuitively player j deviates from a strategy profile (σi)i∈Π and constructs a history h
consistent with σ−j . This history h is called j-promising w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π if player j does not
know yet if this deviation will be ≺j-profitable for him w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π, but he can still hope
that it will be, without knowing what he will play after h.
Definition 4.10. Let (σi)i∈Π be a strategy profile in a game (G, v0), with cost profile
(xi)i∈Π. Let us assume that Π = {1, . . . , n} and
x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xk < xk+1 ≤ . . . ≤ xn
where 0 ≤ k < n. Let h be a history of the game such that xk ≤ |h| < xk+1.
For any player j ∈ Π, we say that h is j-promising w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π if h is consistent with
σ−j and if
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• in the case where xk+1 < +∞:
− if j ≤ k, we have that Costj(h) = xj and ∀ i ∈ Π Costi(h) ≥ xi,
− if j > k, we have that Costj(h) = +∞;
• in the case where xk+1 = +∞:
Costj(h) = xj, ∀ i ∈ Π Costi(h) ≥ xi and ∃ i ∈ Π Costi(h) > xi.
In the case where xk+1 < +∞ and j ≤ k, along h, player j has been able to get the
same cost as along ρ (Costj(h) = xj) and to not decrease the cost of the other players
(Costi(h) ≥ xi). After h, he hopes to be able to play such that the resulting deviation hρ
′
will satisfy (xi)i∈Π ≺j Cost(hρ
′). In the case where j > k, player j has not visited his goal
set along h, so he does not know yet if his deviation will be ≺j-profitable for him. However
he hopes to visit it early enough after h along hρ′, such that Costj(hρ
′) < xj, or to get the
same cost while increasing the cost of the other players in a way that (xi)i∈Π ≺j Cost(hρ
′).
In the case where xk+1 = +∞, the history ρ≤|h| has visited all the goal sets Goali such
that Costi(ρ) < +∞. Thus player j could have a ≺j-profitable deviation hρ
′ if he can avoid
visiting the goal sets Goali, where i ≥ k + 1 (i 6= j).
Given a j-promising history h of player j, the next lemma describes the existence
of interesting memoryless strategies of the coalition Π \ {j} from the last vertex of h.
This lemma uses some qualitative two-player zero-sum reachability under safety games
G−j = (G−j , R, S) associated with the coalition Π\{j} (where G−j = (V, V \Vj , Vj , E)). In
such games, the coalition Π \ {j} aims at reaching R while staying in S, and player j wants
to prevent this.
Lemma 4.11. Let (σi)i∈Π be a secure equilibrium in a game (G, v0), with outcome ρ and
cost profile (xi)i∈Π. Let h be a j-promising history w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π for some player j ∈ Π.
Let us assume w.l.o.g. that Π = {1, . . . , n}. If
x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xk ≤ |h| < |h|+ |V | ≤ xk+1 ≤ . . . ≤ xl < xl+1 = . . . = xn = +∞,
where 0 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ n, then the coalition Π \ {j} has a memoryless winning strategy µv−j
from v = Last(h) in the qualitative two-player zero-sum game G−j = (G−j , R, S) where
• if j ≤ k, then R = ∪i>kGoali, and S = V ,
• if k < j ≤ l, then R = V , and S = V \ Goalj,
• if l < j and Cost(ρ≤|h|) j Cost(h), then R = ∪i>k
i6=j
Goali, and S = V \ Goalj,
• if l < j and Cost(ρ≤|h|) 6j Cost(h), then R = V , and S = V \ Goalj .
In this lemma, either all goal sets are visited by ρ and l = n, or l < n and the last visited
goal set is Goall. Also notice that R 6= ∅ in all cases. Indeed, k 6= n as h is j-promising,
and then the set R in the case j ≤ k of this lemma is not empty. In the third case, it is
not empty either, otherwise we would have k + 1 = l + 1 = n = j but such a situation is
impossible because h is j-promising w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π (see the last case of Definition 4.10) and
(σi)i∈Π is a secure equilibrium .
Proof of Lemma 4.11. By contradiction assume that the coalition Π \ {j} has no winning
strategy from v in the game G−j = (G−j , R, S), i.e. no winning strategy from v to reach R
while staying in S. By Corollary 1.11, it implies that player j has a memoryless winning
strategy µvj from v to stay outside R or to reach V \ S. Recall that h is consistent with
σ−j as it is j-promising w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π. Let ρ
′ be the play with prefix h that is consistent
with σ−j, and with µ
v
j from v (see Fig. 10). In the four cases of the lemma, we then prove
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that (xi)i∈Π ≺j (Costi(ρ
′))i∈Π, meaning that player j has a ≺j-profitable deviation w.r.t.
(σi)i∈Π, which is impossible.
xk
|h|
|h|+|V |
xk+1
Goal1
ρ
Goalk+1
Goall
h
v
ρ′
Goalk
Figure 10: Play ρ and its deviation ρ′ with prefix h.
• j ≤ k.
The strategy µvj enables to avoid all goal sets Goali where i > k. As h is j-promising,
we have that Costj(h) = xj and ∀i ∈ Π, Costi(h) ≥ xi. By construction of ρ
′ and as
xk ≤ |h| < xk+1, we have that
Costj(ρ
′) = Costj(h) = xj ,
∀i ≤ k, Costi(ρ
′) ≥ xi,
∀i > k, Costi(ρ
′) = +∞.
Then for all i ∈ Π, we have that Costi(ρ
′) ≥ xi. It remains to show that the cost of one
player is strictly increased in ρ′ compared with ρ. In the case where xk+1 < +∞, i.e.
k < l, we have in particular that xl < +∞ and Costl(ρ
′) = +∞. And in the case where
xk+1 = +∞ (k = l), we have that (xi)i∈Π ≺j Cost(h) (by definition of j-promising),
i.e. there exists i ∈ Π such that xi < Costi(h). Either Costi(h) = Costi(ρ
′) and then
xi < Costi(ρ
′), or Costi(h) = +∞ > Costi(ρ
′) and so xi ≤ |h| < Costi(ρ
′). In both cases,
it implies that (xi)i∈Π ≺j (Costi(ρ
′))i∈Π.
• k < j ≤ l.
As µvj is memoryless, this strategy enables player j to reach his goal set Goalj from v
within |V | steps. Thus, we have that
Costj(ρ
′) < |h|+ |V | ≤ xk+1 ≤ xj
since k < j ≤ l, and so, (xi)i∈Π ≺j (Costi(ρ
′))i∈Π.
• l < j and Cost(ρ≤|h|) j Cost(h).
The strategy µvj enables to avoid all goal sets Goali where i > k and i 6= j, or to visit
the goal set Goalj. On one hand, if ρ
′ visits Goalj, then
Costj(ρ
′) < +∞ = xj
as j > l, and so, (xi)i∈Π ≺j (Costi(ρ
′))i∈Π. On the other hand, if ρ
′ does not visit Goalj ,
then ρ′ does not visit either any Goali with i > k. Since Cost(ρ≤|h|) j Cost(h), the
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situation is quite similar to the first case, and we can deduce that
Costj(ρ
′) = xj = +∞,
∀i ≤ k, Costi(ρ
′) ≥ xi,
∀i > k, Costi(ρ
′) = +∞.
Thus, for all i ∈ Π, we have that Costi(ρ
′) ≥ xi. Moreover, exactly like in the case
j ≤ k, we can show that there exists i ∈ Π such that xi < Costi(ρ
′). Then it implies that
(xi)i∈Π ≺j (Costi(ρ
′))i∈Π.
• l < j and Cost(ρ≤|h|) 6j Cost(h).
Like in the second case, the strategy µvj enables player j to reach his goal set Goalj
from v. Then we have that
Costj(ρ
′) < +∞ = xj
and so, (xi)i∈Π ≺j (Costi(ρ
′))i∈Π.
Removing a cycle. The next lemma states that it is possible to modify the strategy profile
of a secure equilibrium in a way to eliminate an unnecessary cycle in its outcome. In the
notations of this lemma, notice that β is the eliminated cycle (condition Last(α) = Last(αβ)),
notice also that a new goal set is visited after αβγ (condition Visit(ρ) 6= Visit(α)). The
elimination of the cycle is possible by modifying the strategies of the coalitions into strategies
as described in Lemma 4.11.
Lemma 4.12. Let (σi)i∈Π be a secure equilibrium in a game (G, v0), with outcome ρ. Sup-
pose that ρ = αβγρ˜, with β non-empty and |γ| ≥ |V |, such that
Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ)
Visit(ρ) 6= Visit(α)
Last(α) = Last(αβ).
Then there exists a secure equilibrium (τi)i∈Π in (G, v0) with outcome αγρ˜.
Proof. Let (xi)i∈Π be the cost profile of ρ. Let us assume w.l.o.g. that Π = {1, . . . , n} and
x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xk ≤ |α| < |αβγ| ≤ xk+1 ≤ . . . ≤ xl < xl+1 = . . . = xn = +∞,
where 0 ≤ k < l ≤ n (remark that k < l as Visit(ρ) 6= Visit(α)).
Let us define the required strategy profile (τi)i∈Π with the aim to get the outcome αγρ˜
by eliminating β in ρ. For all i ∈ Π and all histories h ∈ Hi, we set
τi(h) :=


σi(αβδ) if h = αδ,
arbitrary if P (h) = i,
µv
i,P (h)(h) if α 6≤ h, P (h) 6= ⊥, i and ∃h
′v that is P (h)-promising
w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π and verifies h
′v ≤ h and |h′v| = |α|,
σi(h) otherwise,
In this definition, arbitrary means that the next vertex is chosen arbitrarily, and the pun-
ishment function P is defined as in the proof of Proposition 4.5, Part (i) (adapted to the
play αγρ˜). Moreover, when a player j deviates, each player i 6= j plays according to σi,
except in the case of a j-promising history h of length |α| from which he plays according to
µv−j, with v = Last(h) (see Lemma 4.11). Notation µ
v
i,j means the memoryless strategy of
player i induced by µv−j.
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We observe that the outcome of (τi)i∈Π is the play π = αγρ˜ (see Fig. 11 and 12). Let
us write its cost profile as (y1, . . . , yn). It follows that for all i ∈ Π, yi ≤ xi. More precisely,
- if i ≤ k, then yi = xi; (4.3)
- if k < i ≤ l, then yi = xi − (|β| + 1); (4.4)
- if i > l, then yi = xi = +∞. (4.5)
ρ=〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0
ρ′
2
α
β
γρ˜
Figure 11: Play ρ.
π=〈(τi)i∈Π〉v0
π′
1
π′
2
α
γρ˜
Figure 12: Play π and possible deviations.
Assume that there exists a ≺j-profitable deviation τ
′
j for player j w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π. Let
π′ be the outcome of the strategy profile (τ ′j , τ−j) from v0, and (y
′
1, . . . , y
′
n) its cost profile.
Then we know that (y1, . . . , yn) ≺j (y
′
1, . . . , y
′
n). Two possible situations occur according
to where player j deviates from π. We show that the first situation is impossible. In the
second one, we construct a ≺j-profitable deviation σ
′
j for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π, and then
get a contradiction with (σi)i∈Π being a secure equilibrium.
(i) player j deviates from π strictly before depth |α| (see the play π′1 in Fig. 12).
Let us consider the prefix h of π′ of length |α|. We first state that h cannot visit Goalj
in a way that Costj(h) < xj, because h is consistent with σ−j (by definition of (τi)i∈Π),
and (σi)i∈Π is a secure equilibrium. Therefore, h is a j-promising history w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π,
as τ ′j is a ≺j-profitable deviation w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π. By definition of (τi)i∈Π, π
′ is consistent
with µv−j from v = Last(h). We consider the four possible cases of Lemma 4.11:
• j ≤ k.
We have that yj = y
′
j. The coalition Π \ {j} forces the play π
′ to visit Goali, for a
certain i > k (let us recall that k < n), before depth |α|+ |V | as µv−j is memoryless.
And so, y′i < |α| + |V | ≤ |α| + |γ| ≤ yk+1 ≤ yi (as |αβγ| ≤ xk+1 and by Eq. (4.4)).
This contradicts the fact that (y1, . . . , yn) ≺j (y
′
1, . . . , y
′
n).
• k < j ≤ l.
The coalition Π \ {j} prevents the play π′ from visiting Goalj , and so, y
′
j = +∞. As
yj < +∞, it cannot be the case that (y1, . . . , yn) ≺j (y
′
1, . . . , y
′
n).
• l < j and Cost(ρ≤|h|) j Cost(h).
The coalition Π\{j} forces the play π′ to visit Goali, for a certain i > k, i 6= j, before
depth |α| + |V |, while avoiding the visit of Goalj (then, yj = y
′
j = +∞). As in the
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first case, this leads to a contradiction with the fact that (y1, . . . , yn) ≺j (y
′
1, . . . , y
′
n).
• l < j and Cost(ρ≤|h|) 6j Cost(h).
Like in the second case, the coalition Π \{j} prevents the play π′ from visiting Goalj ,
and so, yj = y
′
j = +∞. Moreover, the hypothesis Cost(ρ≤|h|) 6j Cost(h) implies that
(y1, . . . , yn) ≺j (y
′
1, . . . , y
′
n) cannot be true.
(ii) player j deviates from π after depth |α| (π and π′ coincide at least on α, see the play π′2
in Fig. 12).
We define for all histories h ∈ Hj:
σ′j(h) :=
{
σj(h) if αβ 6≤ h,
τ ′j(αδ) if h = αβδ.
Let us set ρ′ = 〈σ′j , σ−j〉v0 of cost profile (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n). As player j deviates after α with
the strategy τ ′j, one can prove that
π′ = απ˜′ and ρ′ = αβπ˜′
by definition of (τi)i∈Π (see the play ρ
′
2 in Fig. 11). Since Visit(α) = Visit(αβ), Equa-
tions (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) also stand by replacing xi with x
′
i and yi with y
′
i (but the
value of l might be different). Then
(x1, . . . , xn) ≺j (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n) iff (y1, . . . , yn) ≺j (y
′
1, . . . , y
′
n),
which proves that σ′j is a ≺j-profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π, and this is
a contradiction.
Goal- and deviation-optimized secure equilibrium. The next lemma uses the ideas devel-
oped in the proof of Lemma 4.12 to show that any secure equilibrium can be transformed
into one that is deviation-optimized. It is the last step before proving Proposition 4.8, and
finally Part (ii) of Proposition 4.5.
Lemma 4.13. Let (σi)i∈Π be a secure equilibrium in a game (G, v0), with outcome ρ. Then
there exists a deviation-optimized secure equilibrium (τi)i∈Π in (G, v0) with outcome ρ.
Proof. Let α be the prefix of ρ of length max{Costi(ρ) | Costi(ρ) < +∞}. It follows that
Visit(ρ) = Visit(α). Then we define the required strategy profile (τi)i∈Π exactly like in the
proof of Lemma 4.12. We only remove the first line of the definition: τi(h) = σi(αβδ) if
h = αδ. One can be convinced that (τi)i∈Π and (σi)i∈Π have the same outcome ρ. We prove
in the exact same way that (τi)i∈Π is a secure equilibrium in (G, v0) (here, k = l).
Let us now show that (τi)i∈Π is deviation-optimized thanks to Lemma 4.6. Let τ
′
j be a
strategy of some player j such that the play ρ′ = 〈τ ′j, τ−j〉v0 verifies
(i) Costj(ρ) = Costj(ρ
′),
(ii) ∀ i ∈ Π such that Costi(ρ) < +∞, we have that Costi(ρ) ≤ Costi(ρ
′),
(iii) ∃ i ∈ Π Costi(ρ) < Costi(ρ
′).
We must prove that there exists l such that Costl(ρ) = +∞ and Costl(ρ
′) ≤ ddev =
max{Costi(ρ) | Costi(ρ) < +∞}+ |V |. Notice that Cost(ρ) = Cost(α).
28 T. BRIHAYE, V. BRUYE`RE, J. DE PRIL, AND H. GIMBERT
On one hand, suppose that Cost(α) 6≺j Cost(ρ
′
≤|α|). By (i), (ii) and (iii), the only
possibility is to have some l such that Costl(α) = +∞ and Costl(ρ
′
≤|α|) < +∞, that is,
Costl(ρ) = +∞ and Costl(ρ
′) ≤ |α| < ddev .
On the other hand, if Cost(α) ≺j Cost(ρ
′
≤|α|), then according to the last case of Def-
inition 4.10, ρ′≤|α| is j-promising w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π. Indeed, ρ
′
≤|α| is consistent with σ−j, and
there exists i ∈ Π such that Costi(ρ) = +∞ (otherwise it would contradict the fact that
(σi)i∈Π is a secure equilibrium). By definition of (τi)i∈Π, ρ
′ is thus consistent with µv−j from
vertex v = ρ′|α|. Thus, by Lemma 4.11 (first case or third case), there exists l such that
Costl(ρ) = +∞ and Costl(ρ
′) < |α|+ |V | = ddev (as µ
v
−j is memoryless).
In both cases, by Lemma 4.6, we proved that (τi)i∈Π is deviation-optimized.
We are now able to prove Proposition 4.8, which states that if there exists a secure equi-
librium in a game (G, v0), then there exists one which is goal-optimized and deviation-
optimized.
Proof of Proposition 4.8. Let (σi)i∈Π be a secure equilibrium in (G, v0) with outcome ρ =
〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0 and cost profile (xi)i∈Π. Let us assume w.l.o.g. that Π = {1, . . . , n} and
x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xl < xl+1 = . . . = xn = +∞
where 0 ≤ l ≤ n. Let us set x0 = 0. For all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , l−1} such that (xk+1−xk) ≥ 2·|V |
and while it is still the case, we apply the following procedure to get a goal-optimized secure
equilibrium.
Consider such a k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , l− 1}. Then, we can write ρ = αβγρ˜, with β non-empty,
|γ| ≥ |V |, and such that
xk ≤ |αβγ| ≤ xk+1
Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ) = {1, . . . , k}
Last(α) = Last(αβ).
Let us remark that Visit(ρ) 6= Visit(α) as k < l. By Lemma 4.12 there exists a secure
equilibrium in (G, v0) with outcome αγρ˜. Its cost profile (yi)i∈Π is such that
y1 = x1, . . . , yk = xk;
yk+1 < xk+1, . . . , yl < xl;
yl+1 = xl+1 = +∞, . . . , yn = xn = +∞.
By applying finitely many times this procedure, we can assume w.l.o.g. that (σi)i∈Π is a
secure equilibrium with a cost profile (x1, . . . , xn) such that
xi < i · 2 · |V | for i ≤ l
xi = +∞ for i > l,
meaning that (σi)i∈Π is a goal-optimized secure equilibrium.
Moreover, by Lemma 4.13, there exists a deviation-optimized secure equilibrium with
the same outcome, i.e. a goal-optimized and deviation-optimized secure equilibrium. And
this concludes the proof.
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Remark 4.14. Regarding the costs, this proof shows that if there exists a secure equilibrium
with cost profile (ai)i∈Π in a game (G, v0), then there exists a goal-optimized and deviation-
optimized secure equilibrium with cost profile (bi)i∈Π in (G, v0), such that for all i ∈ Π,
bi ≤ ai. In particular, the cost profile is usually not preserved.
Finally, on the basis of Proposition 4.8, we are able to prove Part (ii) of Proposition 4.5:
given a game (G, v0), if there exists a secure equilibrium in (G, v0), then there exists a goal-
optimized and deviation-optimized secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ), for d = dgoal(G)+3·|V |.
Proof of Proposition 4.5, Part (ii). Let (σi)i∈Π be a secure equilibrium in (G, v0) with out-
come ρ. By Proposition 4.8, we can suppose w.l.o.g. that (σi)i∈Π is goal-optimized and
deviation-optimized. Let us define the strategy profile (τi)i∈Π in Truncd(T ) as the strategy
profile (σi)i∈Π restricted to the finite tree Truncd(T ). We prove that (τi)i∈Π is a secure
equilibrium in Truncd(T ), which is clearly goal-optimized (d > dgoal(G)).
For a contradiction, assume that player j has a ≺j-profitable deviation τ
′
j w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π.
Let us denote π = 〈(τi)i∈Π〉v0 and π
′ = 〈τ ′j , τ−j〉v0 in Truncd(T ). We extend arbitrarily τ
′
j
in T , into a strategy denoted σ′j, and let ρ
′ = 〈σ′j , σ−j〉v0 . Let us remark that π (resp. π
′)
is a prefix of ρ (resp. ρ′) of length d > dgoal(G), and thus, in particular Cost(ρ) = Cost(π).
Moreover, it is impossible that Costj(π) > Costj(π
′), otherwise we would have Costj(ρ) >
Costj(ρ
′) and so, get a contradiction with the fact that (σi)i∈Π is a secure equilibrium in T .
Then, player j gets the same cost Costj(π) = Costj(π
′) and
∀i ∈ Π Costi(π) ≤ Costi(π
′) ∧ ∃i ∈ Π Costi(π) < Costi(π
′).
We now show that Costj(ρ) = Costj(ρ
′). In the case where Costj(π) = Costj(π
′) = +∞
(= Costj(ρ)), we must have Costj(ρ
′) = +∞. Otherwise, it would contradict the fact that
(σi)i∈Π is a secure equilibrium in T . In the case where Costj(π) = Costj(π
′) < +∞, then
Costj(ρ) = Costj(ρ
′) (as π and π′ are prefixes of ρ and ρ′ respectively). Moreover, since τ ′j is a
≺j-profitable deviation w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π, it follows that for all i ∈ Π such that Costi(ρ) < +∞,
we have that Costi(ρ) ≤ Costi(ρ
′), and there exists i ∈ Π such that Costi(ρ) < Costi(ρ
′). As
(σi)i∈Π is deviation-optimized, Lemma 4.6 implies that there exists some l ∈ Π such that
Costl(ρ) = +∞ and Costl(ρ
′) < ddev = max{Costi(ρ) | Costi(ρ) < +∞} + |V |. As ddev ≤
dgoal(G)+|V | < d, we have that Costl(π) = Costl(ρ) = +∞ and Costl(π
′) = Costl(ρ
′) < ddev .
This gives a contradiction with the fact that τ ′j is a ≺j-profitable deviation w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π in
Truncd(T ). Therefore, (τi)i∈Π is a secure equilibrium in this game. On the other hand, the
previous argument also shows that (τi)i∈Π is deviation-optimized.
Remark 4.15. This proof shows in particular that if there exists a goal-optimized and
deviation-optimized secure equilibrium in (G, v0), then there exists a goal-optimized and
deviation-optimized secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ) with the same cost profile. Together
with Remark 4.14, we then proved the following result: if there exists a secure equilib-
rium with cost profile (ai)i∈Π in (G, v0), then there exists a goal-optimized and deviation-
optimized secure equilibrium with cost profile (bi)i∈Π in Truncd(T ), such that for all i ∈ Π,
bi ≤ ai.
Remarks 4.7 and 4.15 imply the proposition below.
Proposition 4.16. Given a multiplayer quantitative reachability game and a tuple of thresh-
olds (ti)i∈Π ∈ (R ∪ {+∞})
Π, one can decide in ExpSpace whether there exists a secure
equilibrium with cost profile (ci)i∈Π such that for all i ∈ Π, ci ≤ ti.
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The decision problem related to Proposition 4.16 is equivalent to decide whether there
exists a goal-optimized and deviation-optimized secure equilibrium with cost profile (ai)i∈Π
in Truncd(T ) where d = dgoal(G) + 3 · |V |, such that for all i ∈ Π, ai ≤ ti. Notice that d
does not depend on (ti)i∈Π.
5. Conclusion and Perspectives
In this paper, we study the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium, a refinement of Nash
equilibrium well-suited to the framework of games played on graphs. We also introduce the
new concept of subgame perfect secure equilibrium. We prove the existence of subgame
perfect equilibria in multiplayer quantitative reachability games. We also prove the exis-
tence of subgame perfect secure equilibria, but only in the two-player framework. Finally,
we provide an algorithm deciding in ExpSpace the existence of secure equilibria in the
multiplayer case. On the one hand, the first two results have been obtained by topological
techniques, that are completely different from the techniques used in [BBDP10, BBDP11].
On the other hand, proofs of the last result are strongly inspired by proofs developed in
these references, but have required new ideas about the coalition strategies.
There are several interesting directions for future research. We are currently working
on the model of quantitative game, enriched by allowing n-tuples of positive weights on
edges (see Theorem 2.4). We do believe that our results remain true in this context. The
case of Nash equilibria is already treated in [BBDP11]. Notice that our results trivially
generalize to the particular case where the weights of the edges are of the form (c, . . . , c)
with c ∈ N0. Indeed it is enough to replace each such edge by a path of length c composed
of c new edges (of cost 1).
To the best of our knowledge, the existence of secure equilibria in the multi-player
framework is still an open problem. We prove that the existence of a secure equilibrium in
an infinite game is equivalent to the existence of a goal-optimized and deviation-optimized
secure equilibrium in a finite game. This open problem could be positively solved if Corol-
lary 1.14 could be adapted in a way to get a goal-optimized and deviation-optimized secure
equilibrium in the finite game, and then by applying Proposition 4.5. A deeper understand-
ing of equilibria with unnecessary cycles could also be helpful. For the moment, we are not
able to solve this problem with more than two players. The same kind of question is also
open for subgame perfect secure equilibria.
Another research direction concerns a deeper study of the memory needed in the differ-
ent kinds of equilibria. In the case of subgame perfect equilibria and subgame perfect secure
equilibria, the topological techniques give no results on the memory needed. However, in
the case of secure equilibria, we prove that we can limit to finite-memory equilibria.
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